Total Army Analysis Supporting Maximization of National Resources
The United States Army is well known for being an extremely versatile and adaptive organization, and has demonstrated agility in accommodating resource constraints, force structure reductions, and congressional oversight imposed through "the power of the purse." This demonstrated agility has allowed the Army to meet its obligations in defense of the nation for over two hundred years. Much of the Army's ability to provide the requisite force structure and capabilities that allow the institution to fulfill its obligations within the context of national security strategy in recent history is credited to the current Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. While the process has been relatively effective, improvements are required particularly in an era of fiscal constraint, and against the backdrop of looming force structure reductions. These improvements will better enable the Army to integrate force structure and capabilities with Joint Interagency, intergovernmental, multinational partners and eliminate redundancies.
After 11 years of protracted war, and in an era where defense resources will suffer at the expense of the nation's ever increasing national debt and need to sustain domestic entitlements, the National Security Strategy now mandates a shift from unilateral action to a greater reliance on partners and allies to achieve national interests, and ensure global security. Based on this new strategy the Army must quickly adapt to ensure it can fulfill its Title10 functions and responsibilities. No other time in the Army's history have the stakes been so high. Hanging in the balance, is at best, an Army that continues to inefficiently maximize its resources in the form of personnel, dollars, training, and equipment, and at worst is an ill-prepared Army that lacks the strategic capability to meet global challenges as part of a multi-national force and to augment homeland defense in times of crisis. This Strategic Research Paper examines the TAA process and provides Army senior leaders with recommendations to consider for improving the process. In pursuit of this outcome, the research effort begins with a historical analysis of Army force management processes beginning in the aftermath of World War II through current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The paper then examines current national level security strategies and guidance and assesses the effectiveness of the TAA process in developing force structure and capabilities required to enable the Army to fulfill its title ten responsibilities within the context of national strategy. This assessment includes and examination of the TAA process, to include associated risks, and their relationship to the future strategic environment. This is an important requirement for senior leaders as it applies to strategic alignment and maintaining the Army's competitive advantage as the premier land power in the world. The paper then explores potential improvements to the process given impending reductions to current Army force structure by presenting criteria to better assess and evaluate force structure and capabilities required to meet Title 10 responsibilities within a joint interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) construct. This analysis is important in identifying and eliminating redundancies between the Army and JIIM partners.
The desired end state of this research effort is to assist Army senior leaders in improving long-term resource decision-making, using a holistic Department of Defense Historically, the Army has repeatedly faced challenges in maintaining the requisite force structure and capability required to wage the nation's wars. This dynamic stems back to the beginning of the nation. As a young nation with limited resources and a small federal government, the ability to raise and support a standing Army was levied on the people, and the Army was exclusively employed for limited durations and for specific purposes. When hostilities ceased the Army was typically reduced to bare minimums. However, as the nation emerged as an industrial world power during the early 20th century, foreign policy began to shift from isolationism toward imperialism, and the nation's ability to pursue national interests abroad became heavily dependent on a strong and capable military. As a result, the need to align military force structure and capabilities to meet strategic requirements became imperative, and long standing debates pertaining to the allocation of national resources in support of military requirements began to dominate the nation's political landscape. These debates continue today, particularly in an era of fiscal constraint.
In the aftermath of World War II, these debates took on a renewed emphasis, particularly as the nation entered into the cold war struggle against the Soviet Union and sought to project democracy as a more viable approach towards governance in comparison to communism. During this period, significant transformation within the national defense structure, implemented through the 1947 national security act, further increased the intensity of these debates and would require the military to create and modify systems and processes required to ensure adequate force structure and capabilities. From a historical perspective, the period between the end of World War II and the beginning of the current "war on terror" period in Iraq and Afghanistan marks 4 the most significant period of change pertaining to these processes and warrants examination within the context of this research effort. Many of the current challenges associated with military processes and systems such as the Defense Acquisition System, designed to manage force structure and capabilities stem from key actions and events that took place during this period.
After World War II Army force structure was significantly reduced. At the end of the war there were in excess of 8 million Soldiers in a total of 89 divisions in the Army, and within five years, that number was significantly reduced to only 591,000 Soldiers and 10 divisions. Of the 10 Army divisions, 5 were deployed overseas, with 4 assigned to the Far Eastern Command deployed in support of occupation duty in the country of Japan, and 1 division was assigned to the European Command deployed in the country of Germany. The remaining five divisions were stationed in bases throughout the continental United States and were primarily used as a general or strategic reserve to respond to any requirement as determined by national level authorities. In determining the need for reorganization, the Army used wartime experiences as the basis for change. Despite this reorganization, most divisions were well below authorized strength and were hampered by insufficient weapons systems and equipment that was Union led the United States and its allies to pursue a "peace dividend," which resulted in 7 drastic reductions in defense budgets and manpower designed to decrease taxes and divert resources to other uses. In the end, a 535,000 Soldier Active Duty force-a more than 30% cut-was agreed to, constituting the smallest Army since 1939. 6 During the late 1980s, and in light of a declining Soviet threat, the Army executed further force reductions and established a force structure of 15 divisions, which was referred to as the "BASE Force," which remained intact until the onset of conflict with Iraq in the fall of 1990. After the Army's impressive performance during the "100 hours of Conflict" and the liberation of Kuwait, many senior leaders began to strongly advocate for a more technology centered approach toward warfare, and policy debates centered on reducing the size of the Army were renewed. Our Nation is at a moment of transition. Thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, we have responsibly ended the war in Iraq, put al-Qaida on the path to defeat -including delivering justice to Osama bin Laden and made significant progress in Afghanistan, allowing us to begin the transition to Afghans responsibility. At the same time, we must put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength. To that end, the Budget Control Act of 2011 mandates reductions in federal spending, including defense spending…As we end today's wars and reshape our Armed Forces, we will ensure that our military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies. In particular, we will continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future success, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in anti-access environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber. The fiscal choices we face are difficult ones, but there should be no doubt -here in the United States or around the world -we will keep our Armed Forces the best trained, best-led, best-equipped fighting force in history. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," reinforces the President's intent but cautions that in "going forward, we will also remember the lessons of history and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past when our military was left ill-prepared for the future." The document goes on to add, "As we end today's wars and reshape our Armed
Forces, we will ensure that our military is agile, flexible and ready for the full range of contingencies."
In aligning military strategy and priorities to the President's intent and guidance, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance communicates priorities for a 21st century defense that sustains United States global leadership. To begin with, strategic military leaders are committed to reshaping a Joint Force in the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible and technologically advanced. This force will have a global presence with greater emphasis on the Asia Pacific region, while maintaining defense commitments to Europe, and strengthening alliance and partnerships across all regions. Equally as important, the guidance emphasizes the ability to surge and regenerate forces and capabilities to ensure the military is capable of facing, deterring and when required, defeating future threats to national security.
The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance assesses defense strategy based on the changing geopolitical environment, changing fiscal circumstances in the nation, and against the backdrop of a challenging global security environment. In doing so, the guidance notes that for the foreseeable future, the nation will continue to take action to counter a range of threats alongside allies and close partners. As a result, relationships with these partners and allies are critical to global security and for the nation to achieve strategic goals and objectives. Equally as important, is the need to reduce redundancies and enable interoperability between United States military forces and our allies and Based on these five tenants, senior DoD leaders further envisioned significant reductions in Army force structure. Specifically, the Army was directed to remove at least eight brigade combat teams from its force structure to include two heavy infantry divisions forward deployed in Europe. These projected force structure cuts would result in a decrease in Army end strength from 570,000 to roughly 490,000. Given these choices, the strategic implications for the Army in the future are significant, and highlight the critical need to ensure the TAA process is effective enough to enable the Army to fulfill its title ten responsibilities in support of joint war fighting requirements and meet the intent of national level strategic planning guidance.
Aligning the Total Army Analysis Process to Meet Future Requirements
As we look to the future, the uncertainty and complexity of the global security environment demands vigilance. In these challenging economic times, America's Army will join Department of Defense efforts to maximize efficiency by identifying and eliminating redundant, obsolete or unnecessary programs, responsibly reducing end-strength and by evolving our global posture to meet future security challenges. Given this definition, the output of the TAA process should provide a capability broad enough to meet joint war fighting requirements as communicated by GCC.
Nevertheless, as indicated earlier in this document, force structure typically does not congruently meet requirements. One of the most important portions of the TAA process is determining the proper mix of force capabilities to meet GCC demands and requirements.
Determining maneuver force requirements historically proves as the easier problem set to solve when supporting geographic combatant commanders. As we evaluate the proper combat force mix for the future force, Army senior leaders must take a hard look at the affordability and agility of heavy, light, special purposed divisions/brigades, and special operating forces (SOF) as part of a larger force and capabilities within the Department of Defense. These types of capabilities will prove important given the envisioned nature of threats and operational requirements associated with the future operating environment and global landscape. 
TAA Process Improvements and Recommendations
The detailed guidance, direction and choices provided in the strategic documents examined in this research effort provide the framework for the impending TAA process.
This guidance also influences the development of an affordable Army force structure that will meet strategic demands, thereby ensuring the Army maintains its reputation as the premier land force in the world. Changes in the TAA process can improve affordability through capabilities analysis by eliminating redundancies with DoD. This can be accomplished by shifting from an Army centric analysis process to a joint capabilities analysis by using specific force structure requirements outlined in the Global The Impact that these TAA process improvements and force structure recommendations will have on the force while significant, may take many years to change the culture within DoD and each Service. Transformational change must occur at the every level to achieve the objective of combining similar joint capabilities especially in the Force Sustainment and Medical areas. In addition, continued emphasis is needed to ensure compatible command and control (C2) and information support systems. Without seamless communication systems across the services, an efficient joint environment supporting GCC will remain problematic. Lastly, as efficiencies are gained by implementing these recommendations, training executed in a joint environment must become more common if we are to maximize the true capabilities of a Force that will provide ready capabilities to the GCC.
Conclusion
The United States Army currently enjoys a reputation as the world's premiere land power, assisting the United States government with projecting power across the globe to secure allies, partners, and the international economic system. In order to project flexible and adaptable capabilities required to meet these demanding global requirements, institutional processes must support the overall Army mission.
During each inter-war period, national leaders made important decisions as to the correct force mix and size to balance domestic and national security interests. While the United States Army quickly adapted after each of these major drawdowns, harsh lessons from these force reductions must not be repeated as we enter into another post inter war period.
The TAA process or variations thereof have played a critical role in determining the required force to meet future challenges, and while measure of performance and effectiveness were evaluated in terms of victory, as we move into the new era of global uncertainty, fiscal constraints and the national debt require the Army to implement different measures of effectiveness by evaluating the structure based on cost and affordability. If the Army's past is an indication of its ability to adapt to the emerging and future challenges of a Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous environment, the nation can rest assured that it will be up to the task, but not without implementing basic fundamental changes to the TAA process that served us well in the past. My fundamental recommendation to improve the process by moving it toward developing a joint force process at OSD level will potentially eliminate many force and capability redundancies within each of the services, thereby saving taxpayers billions of dollars in manpower, training, equipment, and services throughout the Department of Defense. In addition to these process improvements, changes within the Army culture as it pertains to evaluating decisions based on cost (cost culture), changes to personnel system, as well as a different approaches to select career fields such as strategic planners and foreign area officers that support the requirements of in Phase 0 and Phase IV, if that capability is best supported by the Army. The risks and consequences of missing the mark on the designing the future capabilities to provide Combatant Commanders with the capabilities and capacity to prosecute the next war is too high and important not to mitigate and get right.
Implementing changes to the TAA process and shifting more Title 10 responsibilities to OSD could deliver the necessary savings from redundant capabilities throughout the
